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Abstract 
Purpose: This study aims to examine the effect of audit 
quality on firm value in manufacturing companies listed 
on the Indonesian Stock Exchange in 2013 to 2017.  
Design/methodology/approach: Population in this 
study are all manufacturing companies listed on the 
Indonesian Stock Exchange. Sampling was carried out 
using a purposive sampling method. Research data were 
tested using multiple regression analysis. 
Findings: The results from this study show that audit 
quality has a positive effect on firm value in 
manufacturing companies on the Indonesian Stock 
Exchange.  
Practical Implications: The Indonesian capital market 
gives a positive appreciation to companies that have 
higher quality audits. Higher audit quality is expected to 
reduce agency costs, reduce information asymmetry and 
increase firm value. Companies are advised to use higher 
quality auditors in order to increase firm value in the 
Indonesian capital market. 
Originality/value: Audit quality which is proxied by Big 
4 and non-big 4 auditors has been proven to have a 
positive influence on firm value in manufacturing 
companies on the Indonesia Stock Exchange.
DOI: 10.32602/jafas.2020.001 
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1. Introduction 
This study aims to examine the effect of audit quality on firm value in manufacturing companies 
listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange. According to Afza and Nazir (2014), company owners and 
investors always expect a positive return on their investments. The company's growth is a 
supporting factor for economic growth, supporting factors for industrial growth and at the same 
time showing the company's management performance. Firm value shows the appreciation of 
company owners, investors and potential investors for the corporate financial performance. 
Alsmairat et al. (2018) states that in developing countries, audit quality is one of the factors that 
influence firm value. Companies that have high audit quality can minimize the risk of audit failure, 
prevent fraud and reduce the company's earnings management. Aobdia et al. (2015) state that audit 
quality helps providing information to uninformed investors on company basis value. The capital 
market gives a positive reaction if the company moves from a low-quality auditor to a higher 
quality auditor. 
Kronenberger and Pietzsch (2017) state that auditors are a profession that works on the basis of 
independence, professionalism, and trust. Capital markets require proper verification of financial 
statements to improve business decision processes. Previous research has conducted many studies 
on audit quality, such as Gaynor et al. (2016) which examines the relationship with the quality of 
financial statements, earnings quality (Reyad, 2013), corporate performance (Elewa and El-Hadad., 
2019), auditor reputation (Skinner and Srinivasan, 2012), and earnings management (Inaam et al., 
(2012), Chi et al., (2011)). 
Wang and Huang (2014) explain that audit quality has an important impact on firm value. However, 
there are only few studies that conduct a comprehensive analysis of audit quality and firm value. 
Most research discusses the relationship between audit quality and financial report quality, but 
there is a few research that focuses on audit quality and firm value (Wang and Huang, 2014). 
Hamdan et al. (2012) explain that the increasing accounting scandal in the capital market increases 
awareness of the importance of audit quality. Academics and practitioners state that auditing will 
have a major impact on assessing capital market performance, so the effectiveness of the audit 
process needs to be improved. Fooladi and Farhadi (2011) explain that in implementing the 
principles of corporate governance, companies must conduct annual audits conducted by 
competent and independent third parties. High quality audits are carried out to provide objective 
assurances to shareholders and company management that financial statements are fairly 
presented in terms of financial position, performance and all material matters. The audit process 
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has an important role as an effort to reduce information asymmetry and limit agency problems 
between managers and shareholders. 
Balsam et al. (2003) state that audit activity is a systematic effort to improve the quality of 
information presented in financial statements. Hamdan et al. (2012) explain that some studies still 
debate the basic definition of audit quality, but in general audit quality is associated with the ability 
of external audits to detect events or abnormal transactions in financial statements and 
communicate these findings to the users of financial statements. 
Skinner and Srinivasan (2012) said that audit quality is a central component of good capital market 
functions. Audit quality provides a guarantee of the credibility of the information presented in the 
financial statements. Information in financial statements becomes the basis for users to provide 
more precise and accurate values to the company. Wang and Huang (2014) state that’s by reporting 
performance information appropriately, auditors have a role in maintaining the quality of the 
information in the capital market. This role is useful in assisting capital market practitioners in 
making business decisions, especially in information asymmetry and high agency problems. 
In Indonesian context, Indonesian capital market is an emerging capital market. If the audit has 
good quality, investors in the market are expected to obtain more credible and quality information 
so that investors can be more precise in making business decisions. According to Liao and 
Radhakrishnan (2016), auditors have a guaranteed role for more conservative financial statements 
and a quality audit process. Rodriguez and Alegria (2012) stated that audit quality will reduce the 
risk of information. Based on this situation, the researcher suspects that audit quality is one of the 
most important information that can affect the firm value of manufacturing companies on the 
Indonesian stock exchange. Investors are predicted to give higher value to companies that have 
higher audit quality compared to other companies. 
2. Literature Review And Development Of Hypothesis 
2.1 Agency Theory 
Hill and Jones (1992) describe that in the last few decades, agency theory has become the dominant 
paradigm in the field of financial economics research. The main of agency theory thinking assumes 
that the interests between principals and agents are different. According to agency theory, the 
principal can limit agent deviation behaviors by creating an adequate incentive mechanism for the 
agent. Principals incur monitoring costs that are designed to limit the opportunistic behavior of 
agents. Principals incur costs for agents to guarantee that they will spend the resources well. The 
explanation of agency theory tries to provide solutions to problems that occur in the relationship 
between principals and agents. 
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Jensen and Meckling (1976) explain that agents' opportunities to harm principals can be limited. 
Principals can create supervising mechanisms for agents and the agents limit the bonding. The 
monitoring aspect can be strengthened by the implementation of good governance mechanisms 
within the company. Parks and Conlon (1995) argue that monitoring and compensation are very 
important in agency relationships. The principal must have a monitoring mechanism that can 
appraise the agent's performance appropriately so that the principal can determine the right 
compensation contract and avoid overpayment. 
Rodriguez and Alegria (2012) explain that the demand for quality external audits occurs because of 
agency problems caused by differences in interests between ownership and company management. 
External audit acts as the main supervision system for evaluating the performance of company 
management. Audit quality is also related to public needs for the guarantee of higher quality 
information. Lin and Hwang (2010) state that agency problems raise the risk of information 
asymmetry between management and owner. The asymmetry information will increase the 
demand for external audits. External auditors are responsible for verifying financial statements 
fairly by following GAAP, and financial statements shows the actual economic conditions and real 
profits according to company operation. Thus, verification conducted by the auditor will increase 
the credibility of the financial statements. Audit quality is expected to prevent management 
opportunistic behavior in earnings management to reduce the risk of information about the 
existence of material misstatements or omissions in the financial statements. 
2.2 Audit Quality 
DeAngelo (1981) defines audit quality as the market assumptions probability that financial 
statements contains errors, and the auditors will find and report the errors. The ability to find 
material misstatements in the financial statements will depend on the capabilities of the auditor, 
while the willingness to disclose will depend on the wishes of the auditor. Audit quality has been 
manifested in the audit opinion given, but the study of audit quality is still interesting to analyze. 
According to Balsam et al. (2003) an assessment of the audit process cannot be measured directly. 
Audit quality measurement is multidimensional, and inherently cannot be measured directly. 
Therefore, there is no single characteristic of the auditor could be used as a measurement of audit 
quality. However, DeAngelo (1981) argues that the big 4 public accounting firm (at that time big 8) 
had more competence and independence compared to the others. This happens because the audit 
work process will not depend on the audit fees paid by the client. Big 4 public accounting firms have 
greater assets, large client capitalization, better investment in human resources through training. 
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The study was developed based on the research of DeAngelo (1981), which used big 4 and non-big 
4 public accounting firms as a measure of audit quality. Reyad (2013) state that audit quality is 
different among public accounting firms. Big 4 public accounting firms are considered to have 
higher audit quality compared to non-big 4. The reasons are: having more clients, ability to 
maintain the reputation of public accounting firms, having greater potential resources that can be 
used for recruitment, training, and technology, can withstand losses (e.g.: reject clients with a bad 
reputation). 
Lin and Hwang (2010) exemplify previous studies that have used auditor brand name (auditor 
size), industry specialization, audit tenure, audit fees and services, and independent auditors as a 
proxy for audit quality and are linked to financial statements both directly and indirectly. 
DeAnggelo (1981) states that the big 4 public accounting firm (at that time big 8) provided a 
guarantee of better audit quality so that it had an impact on better earnings quality. This process is 
carried out by the public big 4 accounting firm to protect the auditor's reputation from legal 
exposure and reputation risk originating from misleading client financial statements and optimistic 
earnings reporting. 
Francis and Wang (2008) state that big 4 public accountants have collective experience in 
administering audits on public companies. Big 4 auditors have more hours of audit engagement so 
that they can detect material misstatements better in the audited companies. Auditors from non-big 
4 public accounting firms have less audit experience and are still developing the ability to detect 
misstatement problems in the company. Big 4 public accounting firms are considered to have better 
human capital in their offices. The logical consequence is that auditors from the Big 4 public 
accounting firm will be able to detect and report material misstatements better and make 
corrections to those material errors before the audit report is published. 
2.3 Hypothesis Development 
The link between audit quality and firm value will be discussed in terms of what are the benefits for 
financial information users for a higher quality audit process, and the impact on investment 
decisions made by users. Balsam et al. (2003) explain that corporate managers have an incentive to 
manage corporate earnings. Earnings reporting by the management will have an impact on the 
compensation received, especially if the bonus scheme is determined based on earnings. Audit 
quality is an important component used to limit earnings management behavior so that the 
company owners will not make excessive payments to the management. 
Reyad (2012) conducted a research which correlate audit quality with financial statements. 
Financial statements which are audited by higher quality auditors rarely contain material 
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misstatements. Quality audits can minimize agency costs between shareholders and management. 
Krishnan (2003) found that the evidence in the United States showed that companies audited by big 
6 had better earnings quality compared to non-big 6 with earnings quality measurements based on 
accruals and ERC. Audit plays an important role in limiting agency costs by preventing 
opportunistic managers' behavior on accruals. 
Eshleman and Guo (2014) explained that in a preliminary literature review of research on audit 
quality, the size of public accounting firms namely big 4 and non-big 4 became the main indicators 
of audit quality. Krishnan et al. (2003) show that companies audited by Big 4 public accounting 
firms have better financial report quality compared to non-big 4. Quality audit processes will limit 
agency problems for the opportunistic behavior of management over corporate accruals. The 
financial statements audited by big 4 has a higher association between accruals and returns in the 
company, it means that the market provides a higher quality of valuation of information in the 
financial statements. 
Francis and Wang (2008) revealed that audit quality is an important aspect, especially in countries 
with high litigation. The extreme legal environment and risk management behavior cause the big 4 
public accounting firm in the USA to apply a high level of information quality. Financial statements 
prepared tend to be more conservative than other countries. Wang and Huang (2014) mentioned 
that auditor specialist characteristics influence firm value. The capital market gives a positive value 
to the company audited by auditors who have special expertise and knowledge. 
Lu and Sapra (2009) explain that increasing business risk and increasing litigation risk make 
auditors more conservative. Investors in the capital market will use the information presented in 
the financial statements to provide value for the company's performance. Determination of the 
company's stock price and investment decisions will depend on the information presented in the 
financial statements. The demand for a higher quality audit process and the presentation of more 
conservative financial statements prevents wrong business decisions that cause losses for 
investors. 
Alsmairat et al. (2018) explain that companies are required to conduct external audits to limit 
agency costs. External audits are expected to verify the financial statements fairly and the results 
reflect actual economic conditions. A quality audit process can reduce the opportunistic behavior of 
earnings management, reduce the risk of information on financial statements that contain material 
misstatements, reduce agency costs and reduce information asymmetry between managers and 
company stakeholders. Eshleman and Guo (2014) explain that audit quality can reduce the risks 
faced by company management. Eshleman and Guo (2014) found that big 4 auditors have higher 
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audit quality when compared to non-big 4. This finding is proven by the small number of 
restatement process on company’s financial statements audited by Big 4 auditors. 
Francis and Wang (2008) explained that the big 4 public accounting firm is an international public 
accounting firm with global operations. Big 4 public accounting firms have an incentive to always 
develop and maintain their reputation worldwide. This strategy is carried out with several efforts 
such as standardization of staff training, knowledge sharing practice and global application of audit 
methodologies. In this perspective, big 4 auditors must consistently treat their clients throughout 
the world with the application of earnings quality and accounting conservatism. Gaynor et al. 
(2016) stated that the definition of audit quality has the same direction as the definition of financial 
statement quality. Audit quality is considered by investors and other users of financial statements 
as consideration for evaluating the quality of financial statements. 
Asthana (2014) explains that audit quality affects investors' assessments of earnings quality and 
firm value. This study focuses on audit delay as an indicator of audit quality. The longer audit delay 
shows poor audit quality. Audit delay will have an impact on the delay of annual accounting 
disclosures that cause negative market reactions. Audit delay will create skepticism among 
investors, especially related to reported earnings quality. 
Aobdia et al. (2015) explain that a quality audit engagement process can produce added value to 
the capital market in two ways. First, quality audits provide a positive signal to uninformed 
investors based on providing corporate value. Second, a quality audit process guarantees the 
accuracy of the information presented in the financial statements. Quality information will reduce 
the information asymmetry between the company and investors. Aobdia et al. (2015) show that 
market participants react positively when companies move from low quality auditors to higher 
quality auditors, this shows when the capital market reacts to audit quality. Lu and Sapra (2009) 
state that a quality audit process is expected to increase assurance of the quality of financial 
reporting. Audit quality can reduce information asymmetry and improve firm value. Wang and 
Huang (2014) states that a higher quality audit process can improve firm value. 
Based on the explanation above, the hypothesis in this study was formulated as follows. 
H1: audit quality has a positive effect on firm value. 
3. Research Methodology 
3.1 Population, Sample, and Research Data 
The population of this research is all manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange from 2013 to 2017. Data were obtained from Indonesian Capital Market Directory (ICMD) 
documents, IDX statistical documents, listed company performance summaries, annual reports, and 
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audited financial statements. The sampling technique was carried out using the purposive sampling 
method, with the following criteria: 1) manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange from 2013 to 2017. 2) Possessing audited financial statements presented in the 
Indonesian currency (Rupiah). 3) Possessing complete financial data which is suitable with 
researcher’s need. 
 3.2 Definition of Variable Operations 
Independent Variable 
The independent variable in this study is audit quality. According to DeAngelo (1981), audit quality 
is measured by dummy variables for big 4 and non-big 4. A value of 1 is given if the company is 
audited by a public accounting firm affiliated with a Big 4 public accounting firm, and a value of 0 is 
given otherwise. 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in this study is firm value. Firm value in this study was measured by Tobin 
Q. Tobin Q was measured with the market value of equity plus total debt divided by total company 
assets referring to Wang and Huang (2014). 
Control Variable 
This study uses two control variables, namely leverage, and firm size. According to Rodriguez and 
Alegria (2012), leverage is measured by total debt divided by total company assets. The amount of 
corporate debt is one of the market's concerns in providing value to the company. A high amount of 
debt becomes a risk that must be anticipated by investors. Bankruptcy risk due to default on debt is 
a factor that investors consider in determining firm value. The second control variable is the firm 
size. Firm size is measured by the natural log of total assets (Wang and Huang, 2014). Firm size 
provides security guarantees for investors on the continuity of the company's business. Large 
companies are considered to have smaller risk when compared to small companies. Investors 
generally give more confidence when investing in large companies. 
3.3 Statistic Test 
Multiple Regressions 
The hypothesis in this study was tested with multiple regression analysis. The regression equation 
used in this study is as follows: 
TOBINQt = α + β1 DBIG4t + β2 t LEVt + β3 LNSIZE + e 
Information: 
TOBINQt = Firm Value,  
DBIG4t  = Dummy Big 4 (audit quality), 
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 LNSIZEt = log natural total assets, 
 LEVt  = leverage,  
β1 - β3  = regression coefficient, and  
e  = error. 
Before analyzing the regression model, classic assumption tests will be conducted which include 
the data normality analysis, the Multicollinearity analysis, the autocorrelation test, and the 
heteroscedasticity test. Descriptive statistical testing was also conducted in this study. 
4. Result 
4.1 Sample Selection Results  
This research was conducted at manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange in 2013-2017. The following table shows the results of the sample selection. 
Table 1: Sampling Results 
Sample Criteria  Amount 
Manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange 137 
Manufacturing companies that have complete research data 95 
The number of observations during 2013-2017 475 
Companies with Capital Defisiation 15 
Data does not meet the requirements (outlier) 40 
Final Observation Number 410 
Source: Results of data collection. 
Table 1 explains that in this study there were 95 sample companies with the number of 
observational data 475 companies. Based on further scanning it was found that 15 companies had 
negative equity (capital deficiency), so they were excluded from the analysis. The researcher 
conducted an outlier test to obtain data with a normal distribution. Outlier test results show that 
there are 40 outlier data, so they must be excluded from the analysis. The number of observations 
used in this study was 410 companies during 2013-2017. 
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
The following table shows the results of descriptive statistical tests and correlation tests of each 
research variable. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
DBIG4 410 0 1 0.33 0.47 
LEV 410 0.04 0.96 0.45 0.21 
LNSIZE 410 21.03 33.32 27.86 1.98 
TOBINQ 410 0.20 3.90 1.33 0.82 
Source: Authors' calculations (2019) 
Table 2 portrays the data description of the variables in this study. The audit quality variable 
measured by dummy big 4 has an average value of 0.33 with a standard deviation of 0.47. It shows 
that in the sample companies there are still many companies that have not been audited by Big 4. 
This study uses two control variables, namely leverage and firm size. The leverage variable has a 
minimum value of 0.04 with a maximum value of 0.96. The average value of leverage is 0.66 with a 
standard deviation of 0.21. The firm size variable has a minimum value of 21.03 with a maximum 
value of 33.32. The average value of firm size is 27.86 with a standard deviation of 1.98. The 
dependent variable in this study is firm value. Descriptive statistical results show that the firm 
value measured by Tobin Q has a minimum value of 0.20 with a maximum value of 3.90. The 
average firm value is 1.33 with a standard deviation of 0.82. 
The data used in this study have passed the classical assumptions of research tests which include 
data normality test, autocorrelation test, multicollinearity test, and heteroscedasticity test. 
Tabel 2: Correlation 
Variable LEV LNSIZE DUMBIG4 TOBINQ 
LEV 1 0.013 -0.104* -0.045 
  
0.798 0.036 0.362 
 
410 410 410 410 
LNSIZE 0.013 1 .413** 0.253** 
 
0.798 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
410 410 410 410 
DUMBIG4 -0.104* 0.413** 1 0.243** 
 
0.036 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
410 410 410 410 
TOBINQ -0.045 0.253** 0.243** 1 
 
0.362 0.000 0.000 
 
 
410 410 410 410 
Source: Authors' calculations (2019) 
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Table 2 shows that the highest correlation occurs between audit quality and company size with a 
value of 0.413. The smallest correlation occurs between company size and leverage, which is equal 
to 0.013. 
4.3 Hypothesis Testing 
The hypothesis in this study was tested by multiple regressions. The test results of each hypothesis 
are as follows. 
Table 3: Regression Test Results 
Description  Coefficients  t-statistics p-value 
Constant -0.865 -1.448 0.148 
DBIG4t 0.287 3.105 0.002 
LNSIZE 0.078 -0.642 0.000 
LEV -0.123 3.562 0.521 
Adjusted R Square 0.081   
f-value (f-statistics) 13.02  0.000 
Source: Authors' calculations (2019) 
Table 3 shows that the coefficient of determination shows the R square value of 0.081. It means that 
8.1% of variations in changes in firm value can be explained by audit quality, leverage and firm size. 
The remaining 91.9% is influenced by other factors outside the research model. The results of the F 
value test show an F value of 13.02 with a p-value of 0.000, so it can be concluded that the 
regression model is fit with the data used. 
The hypothesis of the study aims to examine the effect of audit quality on firm value. Regression 
test results showed a regression coefficient of 0.287 with a p-value of 0.002. Regression test gives 
significant results, so it can be concluded that audit quality has a positive effect on firm value. 
Hypothesis 1 is supported. The results of this study support the results of the research of Wang and 
Huang (2014). The testing results of the control variables indicate that firm size influences firm 
value while leverage does not affect firm value.  
In the case of manufacturing companies on the Indonesia Stock Exchange, the greater the firm size, 
the capital market will provide a higher firm value, while leverage does not affect the firm value. 
Investors in the Indonesian capital market feel more secure investing in companies with large asset 
sizes. This study found a positive effect of firm size on firm value but failed to prove the effect of 
leverage on firm value. 
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5. Discussion 
The results of this study indicate that audit quality has a positive effect on the firm value on 
manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. Audit quality in this study is 
measured by dummy variables for big 4 and non-big 4 auditors. These results indicate that the 
capital market reacts positively to companies audited by Big 4 public accounting firms when 
compared to companies audited by non-big 4 public accounting firms. The competencies and 
advantages possessed by big 4 auditors become a logical explanation for why the capital market has 
a positive reaction. In terms of human resources, assets, and networks, big 4 auditors provide a 
guarantee of a higher quality audit process. Wang and Huang (2014) explain that big 4 auditors 
have better auditor value chains that lead to the formation of specialist audits and a better 
understanding of knowledge when compared to non-big 4. 
Reyad (2013) explains that audit quality shows the ability of the audit process to detect and report 
material misstatements from financial statements and reduce the level of information asymmetry 
between management and shareholders. Companies that are audited by higher quality auditors will 
be able to improve quality financial reports. There are no material misstatements in reporting, 
financial data is presented more conservatively and will have an impact on lower agency costs. 
According to Klai and Omri (2011), there were many financial scandals involving auditors, causing 
high demands for the quality of financial statements. Companies are required to implement 
corporate governance more stringently to be one of the efforts to protect interested parties in the 
company (Chalaki et al., 2012). Reyad (2013) explains that with quality external audits, companies 
are expected to have credible financial statements that are free from misleading financial 
information. 
According to Skinner and Srinivasan (2012), audit quality is related to the auditor's reputation. 
Choosing to use the services of an auditor who has been exposed to a case or has been labeled by a 
failed public accountant firm is a big risk for the client. The company will choose a more reputable 
public accountant firm to avoid litigation aspects. The company's decision to choose the big 4 
auditors is reacted by market participants by giving a higher value. The company's decision to use 
the services of higher quality auditors shows a commitment to protect the rights of users of 
financial information. Lu and Sapra (2009) explained that the audit process provides quality 
assurance of information risk. The risk of this information will have an impact mainly on the 
information asymmetry and business decisions made by investors. Eshleman and Guo (2014) 
explained that by choosing higher-quality auditors reduces the risk borne by the client in the 
litigation aspect and improves earnings quality.  
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The Indonesian capital market gives a positive appreciation to companies audited by Big 4 auditors. 
This can be seen from the influence of audit quality on firm value in manufacturing companies on 
the Indonesia Stock Exchange. The positive impact of audit quality can be seen from several 
impacts, including more precise quality financial statements, lower earnings management, lower 
agency costs, and information asymmetry. The above reasons explain why the capital market gives 
higher values to companies audited by big auditor 4. 
6. Conclusion 
Based on the analysis and discussion in the previous section, it can be concluded that audit quality 
has a positive impact on the firm value on manufacturing companies on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange. The Indonesian capital market places a higher value on manufacturing companies that 
are audited by big 4 public accounting firms when compared to companies audited by non-big 4 
public accounting firms. 
The limitation of this research is that this research is only conducted on manufacturing companies 
so that the results of the research cannot be generalized to all types of companies on the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange. Further research is expected to develop samples for all companies on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange, and add other variables that are thought to affect the value of the 
company such as earnings quality and accounting conservatism. 
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